Thank you, Nico, for your comments. They are right to say that there is no appropriate sunset clause for the withdrawal of SLAs, only a sunset clause for when their sovereign status is to be reviewed and returned to the ICJ if there is no agreement. Finally, it will be useful for the EU, as a new interested party, to become a party to the new implementation and guarantee contract. This will allow the EU to play an active role in ensuring security and assistance in the implementation of the agreement on its internal mechanisms, bearing in mind that the referral to the International Court of Justice does not apply to the EU as it does not have the power to bring an action. In this final phase of the Cyprus negotiations, the UN and the various parties should work hard to qualify the hard guarantees and extend the soft guarantees, in particular with a view to implementing the comprehensive settlement they intend to achieve in Switzerland this month. Finally, problems related to the implementation of the 1960 Regulation establishing the Republic of Cyprus were one of the reasons why intermunicipal problems began shortly after independence. It is essential to ensure legally binding obligations and the means to enforce them. The compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with respect to the Cyprus Settlement and its implementation is one way to shape the settlement of potential disputes. This means that all parties should agree that in the event of international disputes that cannot be resolved within a reasonable time through negotiation and/or mediation by the United Nations or the EU, they may be referred to the ICJ by any state in dispute. The Guarantee Treaty is a contract between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, announced in 1960. Wisely, all parties agreed that the principle that should guide their deliberations is that «the security of one party should not create uncertainty for the other party». This principle should determine both the scope and scope of physical security.
Greece and Turkey could, if they wished, keep a limited number of their troops on the island to ensure strict security for their ethnic compatriots (say, 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers, as already provided for in the 1960 Treaty of Alliance), but only under the authority of FORCEU II and with a sunset clause for a possible withdrawal. If agreed, Greek troops should operate only in the Greek Cypriot state and Turkish troops only in the Turkish Cypriot state. Note that the existing Treaty of Alliance provides for the permanent stationing of Greek and Turkish troops, so this clause should be revised. The existing guarantee contract exaggerates the hard guarantees, i.e. the neo-colonial rights of intervention that the guarantors have obtained in the event of a breach, rather than the responsibility they (and the Cypriots) have assumed, and what happens if they do not fulfil them. This harshness is summed up in the threat of violence, as ambiguously implied by the warranty contract, since a guarantor «reserves the right to act» in the event of a breach of important provisions of the contract. Note, however, that Hans Kelsen, in a legal opinion commissioned by the UN in 1959, just before independence, to assess the suitability of the future Republic of Cyprus to become a member, stated that «the right to act» does not mean «an unlimited right to intervene through the use of armed force» (Kelsen`s opinion is reproduced in S. Soulioti (ed.) Independence hindered: Cyprus 1878-1964, vol. 2, The Documents, 2006, pp. 253-260).
Despite differences over strict security allocations, the 1960 Guarantee Treaty clearly downplays flexible safeguards, i.e. a set of legally binding obligations under which the system will be fully implemented, including a legally binding commitment that all potential disputes will be resolved peacefully if and to the extent necessary by international decisions. First of all, I would like to ask a question about my rightful honour. We have to look at the provisions of each individual treaty, and that is why I have tried not only to speak broadly, but also to try to improve and reformulate it. The details of what has been proposed are included in the White Paper, but the agreement reached on the movement of the villagers of Akrotiri depends on whether they want it or not; In other words, the amount of funding is not paid in advance: it is paid when people move. Cyprus gained independence from the United Kingdom on 16 August 1960 through the Zurich and London Agreements. The alliance agreement was a simultaneous attempt to defuse the dangerous Cypriot dispute between Greece and Turkey. Post-conflict phase (August 11, 1964 – July 19, 1974): Egyptian President Nasser expressed his support for the Greek Cypriot government on August 11, 1964. Un Mediator Sakari Tuomioja died on 9 September 1964 in Helsinki and was replaced on 16 September 1964 by Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador as UN Mediator. Galo Plaza Lasso entered on the 31st. In December 1965, he returned as UN mediator.
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots clashed near the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou from 20 July to 6 August 1967, resulting in the deaths of ten people. On 15 and 16 November 1967, Greek Cypriot police clashed with Turkish Cypriots near the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, resulting in the deaths of 24 Turkish Cypriots and four Greek Cypriots. Turkey sent an ultimatum to Greece on November 17, 1967, demanding the immediate withdrawal of some 20,000 Greek troops from Cyprus. Greece rejected the Turkish ultimatum on November 22, 1967. The UN Secretary-General called for peaceful negotiations on 22 and 24 November 1967. US President Lyndon Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance as mediator in the conflict on November 22, 1967. On 25 November 1967, the UN Security Council calls for peaceful negotiations. Cyrus Vance served as mediator on the 1st. In December 1967, Greece and Turkey signed an agreement to withdraw troops (demobilization). The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Manlio Brosio, attempted to mediate between Greek and Turkish representatives on 23 and 28 November 1967.
Greece began withdrawing its troops from Cyprus on December 8, 1967, and Greece completed the withdrawal of troops on January 16, 1968. President Makarios was re-elected for a second term on 25 February 1968. Parliamentary elections were held on 5 July 1970 and the United Party (Eniaion) won 15 of the 35 seats in the House of Representatives. The Progressive Workers` Party (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou-AKEL) won nine seats in the House of Representatives. President Makarios was overthrown by a military rebellion on July 15, 1974, and Nicos Sampson assumed the presidency on July 16, 1974. About 300 people were killed during the military uprising of 15 and 16 July 1974. Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit condemned the military uprising of July 15, 1974 and mobilized troops against the military uprising that began on July 16, 1974. About 350 people were killed in political violence between August 1964 and July 1974. The first parliamentary elections were held in July 1960. Of the 35 seats allocated to Greek Cypriots, 30 were won by Makarios supporters and 5 by the Communist-led Progressive Workers` Party (AKEL). The 15 Turkish Cypriot seats were won by supporters of Küçük.
Cyprus became a republic on 16 August 1960 and was admitted as a member of the United Nations. The British government agreed to provide financial support over a period of five years, and Cyprus became a member of the Commonwealth in March 1961. The SLAs are the elephant in the room that no one is talking about. .